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Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?
by
JOSEPH R. GRODIN*
Professor Kelso has provided a useful compendium and evalua-
tion of suggestions for unburdening California's appellate courts, and
for the most part I share his views. However, one suggestion that
Kelso endorses heartily-indeed, he calls it "the most important thing
appellate courts can do to reduce not only their own caseloads, but
also the burden placed upon trial courts"'-invites more careful scru-
tiny. It is that appellate courts "[develop] stable, certain, and predict-
able rules of law"; 2 and that they do so through a general preference
for "rules" rather than "standards." According to Professor Kelso,
courts should have preferred (to use his examples) the old "stop, look,
and listen" rule to the standard of "reasonableness" for determining
the plaintiff's right to recover for injury at a railroad crossing; they
should have stayed with the former "clear rule" forbidding recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent aggravation of per-
sonal injury or property damage, rather than move toward the more
recent multi-factored balancing test; they should have stuck with con-
tributory negligence rather than adopt comparative negligence stan-
dards; and they should have avoided the "confusing" qualities of
modem products liability law and assumption of risk doctrines.
It is not my intent here to debate the merits of particular doc-
trines; what I question, rather, is the wisdom of advising appellate
judges that they should routinely opt for the particular kinds of doc-
trines favored by Professor Kelso for their asserted clarity and sim-
plicity as a means of ameliorating judicial workloads. The advice, for
a number of reasons, seems problematic.
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1. J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTNGS L.J.
433, 450 (1994).
2. Id.
[569]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
To begin with, judicial economy seems a questionable basis for
formulating common-law legal doctrine. Stability, certainty, and pre-
dictability are obvious values in a legal system. Such values promote
confidence in the rule of law, and likely make the resolution of dis-
putes a less costly enterprise. Parties to litigation understand that, or
they should, and legislatures might well decide that the enforcement
of particular principles through litigation costs more than it is worth.3
But to tell a party that he is going to lose because the courts have
decided that the application of otherwise appropriate principles would
take too much of their time is not likely to be seen as a manifestation
of justice.
It must also be taken into account that a preference for rules over
standards is likely to favor the protection of certain interests over
others. In the area of criminal procedure, for example, a preference
for clear bright lines (with respect to application of the Miranda warn-
ing rule or the rule requiring warrants for searches, for example) is
likely to favor criminal defendants over prosecutors. One could think
of rules that would favor tort plaintiffs over defendants (per se rules
of liability, for example), but that is not true of Professor Kelso's ex-
amples. The premise underlying Professor Kelso's prescription seems
to be that the best means of avoiding tort litigation is by cutting down
on the plaintiff's chance for recovery. Indeed, his choice of contribu-
tory negligence over comparative negligence does not seem to be jus-
tified by a preference for rules over standards at all (since the criteria
for determining negligence can hardly be called a rule), nor for cer-
tainty over unpredictability, but rather by a preference for the stan-
dard that gives the plaintiff less chances of winning, and therefore less
incentive (to use Professor Kelso's metaphor for jury trials) "to give a
throw of the litigation dice."' 4 It is indisputable that cutting back on
people's legal rights, and hence on their chance of legal success, will
cut back on their incentive to litigate. An enormous body of litigation
could be avoided by eliminating the laws that prohibit discrimination
in employment, for example. The question is whether cutting back on
the plaintiff's chance to recover is a general policy that appellate
courts should be advised to adopt.
3. For that matter, a legislature might do a whole lot of things likely to have greater
effect in reducing the work of courts than manipulating doctrine. I suspect that the effi-
ciency to be gained by following Professor Kelso's advice is trivial compared to what might
be gained by removing whole categories of cases from the courts (drunk driving, prostitu-
tion, and debt collection cases, for example) and shifting them to an administrative
tribunal.
4. Id. at 449.
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Apart from the built-in bias effect that a general preference for
rules over standards may have in certain areas, there is the question
whether what passes for a "rule" really provides greater certainty and
predictability. The answer depends, of course, upon how the rule is
formulated, and upon the sharpness of its edges. Consider, for exam-
ple, what Professor Kelso characterizes as the "clear rule" in Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.5 requiring aggravation of personal in-
jury or property damage as a condition to recovery for emotional dis-
tress. As the dissenting opinion in that case observed, the law may
have been "clear" when it simply denied recovery altogether for emo-
tional shock.6 But as catalogued by the dissenting opinion, state
courts had already recognized the unjustified narrowness of the
"clear" rule, and had consequently limited and muddied the rule by
allowing recovery for shock accompanied by physical "impact," then
further allowing recovery for shock even without impact if the plain-
tiff was in the "zone of danger," and finally allowing recovery in sev-
eral cases for shock unaccompanied by impact and outside the zone of
danger if an intentional tort to a family member was involved.7 In
sum, the rule's formulation at the time Amaya was decided could
hardly be said to characterize the sort of clarity that made it easy to
predict outcomes.
By characterizing the court's approach in Amaya as rule-based,
Professor Kelso is then able to criticize the court's subsequent opinion
in Dillon v. Legg8 for confusing what was a clear rule with factor bal-
ancing.9 However, as illustrated above, there was no clear rule at the
time Amaya was decided, and thus what the California Supreme
Court did in Dillon was not to substitute uncertainty for clarity, but
(for better or worse) to move an already fuzzy line a bit further in the
direction of plaintiffs.
Leaving aside the problem of bias, and assuming for purposes of
discussion that the choice of a rule over a standard does promote effi-
ciency through certainty and predictability, there remains the question
whether that choice, in the context under consideration, is consistent
with our notions of justice. Certainly an efficient set of criteria is an
aspect of a just legal system, but it is just as certainly not the only
aspect. A rule disqualifying all persons with serious disabilities from
5. 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).
6. Id. at 527-28 (Peters, L, dissenting).
7. Id. The majority opinion provides a full discussion of these cases. Id. at 514-25.
8. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
9. Kelso, supra note 1, at 449.
employment may be efficient, but society has come to accept that jus-
tice requires case-by-case consideration of ability to do particular
work.
Indeed, the history of the common law might be described in
terms of a continuing tension, and a continuing swing of the pendu-
lum, between rules and standards within various areas of the law. The
common-law judges developed a rigid, formalistic view of dispute res-
olution, and along came the equity courts with a more flexible ap-
proach. Then chancellors in equity were accused of making decisions
based upon their respective footlengths, or their breakfast menus, and
back came some rules. In more modern times, a tension typically de-
velops between the rules and perceived principles of justice, and
courts begin to allow for exceptions. Some bright law student writes a
law review note observing that the exceptions are so numerous and so
vaguely defined as to "swallow the rule," and the courts proceed to
adopt the multi-factored standards that the bright student has pro-
posed. And so it goes, until someone suggests that the standards pro-
vide insufficient predictability, and that a "clear bright line" is needed.
Enter Professor Kelso.
The overall lesson, it seems to me, is that the tension between
categorical and individualized decision making cannot equitably be re-
solved on the basis of a general preference for one over the other. To
put the matter differently, the tension cannot be resolved by a rule.
What is required, rather, is an area-by-area, doctrine-by-doctrine anal-
ysis that takes into account the subtleties of particular legal problems,
the extent to which the area is pervaded by principles of general appli-
cation, the ability of a rule both to provide predictability and to do
justice, and the respective competence of courts and legislatures. If
that turns out to be a standard, so be it.
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